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Abstract. In this paper, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific 
realism, like the arguments advanced by Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-
called “Old Induction,” like Vickers’, and the so-called “New Induction,” like Stanford’s, are 
both guilty of confirmation bias, specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly 
challenges scientific realism, while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the 
historical episodes Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between 
a pessimistic interpretation and an optimistic interpretation. For these reasons, these arguments 
are fallacious, and thus do not pose a serious challenge to scientific realism. 
 
1. Introduction 
Scientific Realism is usually taken to include one or more of the following theses (Psillos 2006, 
135): 
The Metaphysical Thesis: The world has a definite and mind-independent structure. 
The Semantic Thesis: Scientific theories are truth-conditioned descriptions of their 
intended domain. Hence, they are capable of being true or false. The theoretical terms 
featuring in theories have putative factual reference. So if scientific theories are true, the 
unobservable entities they posit populate the world. 
The Epistemic Thesis: Mature and predictively successful scientific theories are well-
confirmed and approximately true. So entities posited by them, or, at any rate entities 
very similar to those posited, inhabit the world. (See also the introduction to Psillos 1999 
and Chakravartty 2007 for a useful classification of realist and antirealist views about 
science.) 
Arguments from the history of science are typically advanced by antirealists against the 
epistemic thesis of scientific realism. Antirealists point out that there are scientific theories that 
were predictively successful, i.e., they made novel predictions that were borne out by 




The history of science is a graveyard of theories that were empirically successful for a 
time, but are now known to be false, and of theoretical entities—the crystalline spheres, 
phlogiston, caloric, the ether and their ilk—that we now know do not exist. Science does 
not have a good track record for truth, and this provides the basis for a simple empirical 
generalization. Put crudely, all past theories have turned out to be false, therefore it is 
probable that all present and future theories will be false as well. That is the pessimistic 
induction (Lipton 2005, 1265). 
The historical premise of this pessimistic argument is often supported by a list that Laudan 
complied in his (1981). Here is Laudan’s list: 
 Crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy; 
 Humoral theory of medicine; 
 Effluvial theory of static electricity; 
 ‘Catastrophic’ geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) deluge; 
 Phlogiston theory of chemistry; 
 Caloric theory of heat; 
 Vibratory theory of heat; 
 Vital force theories of physiology; 
 Electromagnetic aether; 
 Optical aether; 
 Theory of circular inertia; 
 Theories of spontaneous generation (Laudan 1981, 33). 
 
More recently, Vickers (2013) sought to “confront” scientific realism by expanding and 
improving upon Laudan’s list. Vickers (2013, 190) claims that “the new realist position [i.e., the 
divide et impera strategy (see, e.g., Kitcher 2001, 18 and Psillos 1999, 106)] needs to be 
thoroughly tested against relevant episodes from the history of science.” For Vickers, 
This means presenting cases from the history of science in which novel predictive 
success was achieved by a scientific theory later rejected as (very) false and then asking 
whether one or another variation on the divide et impera strategy succeeds for such cases 
(Vickers 2013, 190). 
Vickers proceeds to list twenty such cases, three of which he discusses at great length. 
Another argument from the history of science against scientific realism was advanced by 
Stanford (2006). According to Stanford (2006, 20), “the history of scientific inquiry itself offers 
a straightforward rationale for thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best theories 
equally well confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the 
time.” Stanford (2006, 19) calls his argument “the new induction over the history of science” 
(emphasis in original) to distinguish it from the old pessimistic induction (cf. Enfield 2008). 
In what follows, I argue that both the Old Induction and the New Induction are guilty of 
the same charge, namely, confirmation bias, or more specifically, cherry-picking a few cases 
from the history of science that are taken to pose a challenge to scientific realism. Since 
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scientific realism is supposed to be a scientific explanation that is supported by a defeasible 
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), however, this strategy of arguing against scientific 
realism is ineffective. 
Here is how I plan to proceed. In Section 2, I show that the Old Induction, even the one 
based on Vickers’ (2013) new and improved list, is fallacious. In Section 3, I show that 
Stanford’s (2006) New Induction is fallacious as well. I also show that the historical episodes 
Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between a pessimistic 
interpretation and an optimistic interpretation. I conclude that the Old Induction and the New 
Induction are fallacious arguments, and thus they fail to pose a serious challenge to scientific 
realism. 
 
2. The Old Induction 




3. Fresnel’s theory of light and the luminiferous ether 
4. Rankine’s vortex theory of thermodynamics 
5. Kekulé’s theory of the Benzene molecule 
6. Dirac and the positron 
7. Teleomechanism and gill slits 
8. Reduction division in the formation of sex cells 
9. The Titius-Bode law 
10. Kepler’s predictions concerning the rotation of the sun 
11. Kirchhoff’s theory of diffraction 
12. Bohr’s prediction of the spectral lines of ionized helium 
13. Sommerfeld’s prediction of the hydrogen fine structure 
14. Velikovsky and Venus 
15. Steady state cosmology 
16. The achromatic telescope 
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17. The momentum of light 
18. S-matrix theory 
19. Variation of electron mass with velocity 
20. Taking the thermodynamic limit (Vickers 2013, 191-194) 
Vickers claims that divide et impera realism (see, e.g., Kitcher 2001, 18 and Psillos 1999, 106) is 
“challenged by” his new list (Vickers 2013, 209) and that the “20 cases presented leave the 
realist having to say something” (Vickers 2013, 194). 
Unfortunately, Vickers does not say exactly how these cases are supposed to “confront” 
or “challenge” scientific realism (of the divide et impera variety) and why “the realist has to say 
at least something about them” (Vickers 2013, 194). There are basically two ways to interpret 
Vickers’ list as a challenge to scientific realism: 
Inductive generalization: Like Laudan’s list, Vickers’ list is supposed to be a sample 
from which it can be inferred by inductive generalization that most predictively 
successful theories are (and will be) rejected as strictly false. 
Deductive argument from counterexamples: Vickers’ list is a list of counterexamples that 
refute the realist’s claim that novel predictive success is a reliable indicator of 
approximate truth. 
I will now consider these two interpretations of Vickers’ argument against divide et impera 
realism. 
2a. Vickers’ argument as an inductive generalization 
If Vickers’ list does indeed support the inductive inference to the conclusion that most 
predictively successful theories are rejected as strictly false, then it would follow that novel 
predictive success is not a reliable mark of approximate truth, even as far as the working posits 
of successful theories are concerned. That is, the inductive generalization from Vickers’ list 
would run as follows: 
100% of the predictively successful theories on Vickers’ list are strictly false. 
Therefore, probably, 
Most predictively successful theories are strictly false. 
If this inductive generalization were cogent, then it would show that our predictively successful 
theories, even our current ones, will probably be rejected as strictly false eventually, since most 
predictively successful theories are strictly false. 
As Park (2011) and I (2013a) have argued, since Laudan’s list is not a random sample of 
scientific theories, which means that it cannot be a representative sample of scientific theories, 
any inductive argument that is based on Laudan’s list commits the fallacy of biased statistics. 
(For other recent criticisms of the pessimistic induction, see Doppelt 2007, Frost-Arnold 2011, 
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and Park 2014.) That is, an inductive argument from a sample that is based on Laudan’s list is a 
bad inductive generalization because it commits the “fallacy of biased statistics” (Park 2011, 83) 
and because the “theories on Laudan’s list were not randomly selected, but rather were cherry-
picked in order to argue against a thesis of scientific realism” (Mizrahi 2013a, 3220), given that 
“Cherry picking is wrong on all statistical approaches” (Dienes 2011, 280). (See also Mayo 
1996.) 
So, if Vickers’ argument, like Laudan’s pessimistic induction, is meant to be an inductive 
generalization from a sample, then it, too, faces a serious problem. Like Laudan’s list, Vickers’ 
list is not a random sample of successful but false theories, which means that it, too, cannot be a 
representative sample of scientific theories. Like Laudan’s list, Vickers’ list is too small a sample 
to support an inductive generalization about successful theories. Moreover, the successful 
theories on Vickers’ list were not randomly selected but rather were cherry-picked in an attempt 
to challenge scientific realism. A sample is random just in case “every member of the population 
you are drawing conclusions about has the same chance of making its way into the sample” 
(Godfrey-Smith 2011, 39). As far as Vickers’ list is concerned, this condition of random 
sampling is violated, since the theories on Vickers’ list were cherry-picked, and thus it is not the 
case that all successful theories had the same chance of making it into Vickers’ list. Vickers’ list, 
then, fails to “confront” or challenge scientific realism (specifically, divide et impera realism) 
because any inductive inference from Vickers’ list to the effect that most successful theories are 
strictly false, and thus that divide et impera realism is probably false, would be fallacious, given 
that Vickers’ list is a small and biased sample. In fact, when a proper random sample of 
successful theories is collected, the results might actually support an optimistic, rather than a 
pessimistic, induction (Mizrahi 2013a, 3222). 
Arguing against scientific realism, particularly the epistemic thesis of scientific realism, 
by cherry-picking a few cases from the history of science is an ineffective strategy. To see why, 
recall that the scientific realist’s main argument is the No-Miracles Argument (NMA). The NMA 
is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). As such, its premises, if true, only lend probable, 
not conclusive, support to its conclusion. In other words, the inference is defeasible; scientific 
realism (of the divide et impera variety) is said to be the best explanation for novel predictive 
success, and hence probable. Indeed, scientific realists have been clear about this from the get 
go. As Putnam writes: 
That terms in mature scientific theory typically refer […], that the theories accepted in a 
mature science are typically approximately true […]—these statements are viewed by the 
scientific realist not as necessary truth but as part of the only scientific explanation of the 
success of science (Putnam 1975, 73; emphasis added). (Cf. Worrall 2011, 13.) 
Of course, trying to undermine scientific explanations that are based on defeasible inferences by 
cherry-picking a few cases is bound to fail unless we have good reasons to believe that the 
cherry-picked cases are representative of the general population (cf. Mizrahi 2013a, 3224). As 
far as Vickers’ list is concerned, however, we have no reasons to think that the theories on his list 
are representative of the general population of successful theories. Since Vickers’ list is not a 
random sample, we have no reason to think that it is a representative sample. Since we have no 
reason to think that Vickers’ list is a representative sample, for all we know, it may consist 
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entirely of outliers. Just as the claim that smoking increases one’s chances of getting lung cancer 
cannot be “confronted” or challenged by selecting a few outliers (i.e., people who smoke but do 
not get sick with lung cancer), the scientific realist’s claim that approximate truth is the best 
explanation for novel predictive success cannot be “confronted” or challenged by selecting a few 
outliers (i.e., successful but false theories). To seriously challenge scientific realism, what is 
needed is random sampling, not cherry-picking. 
It is worth noting that to say that a sample is not random because the members of the 
sample have been cherry-picked is not to say that the cherry-picking was intentional or 
deliberate. The “tendency to cherry-pick evidence or argumentative points that favor the prior 
belief” (Henley 2014, 220) is a kind of confirmation bias, which “can occur unconsciously” 
(Coon and Mitterer 2013, 21). In other words, whether the arguer intended it or not, a sample 
that was selected non-randomly cannot be representative of the target population as a whole. For 
a sample to be representative of the general population, it must be the case that “every member 
of the population you are drawing conclusions about has the same chance of making its way into 
the sample” (Godfrey-Smith 2011, 39). 
2b. Vickers’ argument as a deductive argument from counterexamples 
It might be objected that Vickers’ argument is not meant to be an inductive argument at all. 
Instead, it is supposed to be a deductive argument from counterexamples (Lyons 2002). More 
explicitly, the objection goes, Vickers’ argument is supposed to run as follows: 
V1. If the approximate truth of the essential parts of successful theories explains their 
novel predictive success, then there would be no successful theories that are 
strictly false. 
V2.  There are successful theories that are strictly false (such as those on Vickers’ list). 
V3.  Therefore, it is not the case that the approximate truth of the essential parts of 
successful theories explains their novel predictive success. 
Although this argument appears to have a valid form (i.e., modus tollens), I think that this 
argument is fallacious for pretty much the same reasons that Laudan’s pessimistic induction is 
fallacious when construed as a reductio of the epistemic thesis of scientific realism (Mizrahi 
2013a, 3211-3215). To see why, note that Vickers himself characterizes divide et impera realism 
as follows: 
[DIR] When a theory achieves novel predictive success, then, probably (although not 
always), that means that the parts of the theory responsible for that success are at least 
approximately true (Vickers 2012, 17; emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, Vickers acknowledges that DIR is a statistical, not a universal, generalization. That 
is, the form of the realist’s claim is not ‘All Fs are Gs’ but rather ‘Most Fs are Gs’, or more 
accurately, ‘Fness is a reliable predictor of Gness’. A claim of this form, however, cannot be 
refuted, or even challenged, by a few selected counterexamples. To see why, suppose, for 
example, that high scores on standardized tests are reliable predictors of college success. In that 
case, a few selected high school graduates who scored high on standardized tests but failed in 
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college do not refute, or even challenge, the claim that high scores in standardized tests are 
reliable predictors of college success, since such a claim is based on statistical evidence, and the 
selected graduates who failed in college may simply be outliers. To allow a select few, albeit 
vivid, counterexamples to overshadow statistical evidence is a mistake in reasoning known as 
“misleading vividness” (Salmon 2013, 151). 
Moreover, confirmation holism, which is generally accepted among philosophers of 
science, means that, strictly speaking, scientific hypotheses cannot be refuted by 
counterexamples. As Okasha explains: 
According to the doctrine of confirmation holism, also known as the ‘Quine-Duhem’ 
thesis, the empirical content of a scientific theory cannot be parcelled out individually 
among the constituent components of the theory. Thus when a theory makes an empirical 
prediction which turns out to be false, it will not be automatically obvious where to lay 
the blame, i.e., which component of the theory to reject. Logic tells us there is an error 
somewhere in the set of statements which implies the false prediction, but does not tell us 
where. So there will be various ways of modifying our theory to inactivate the false 
implication (Okasha 2002, 306). 
Given confirmation holism, then, premise V1 would be strictly false, since DIR says that there 
would be some successful but false scientific theories. More importantly, to derive the prediction 
(i.e., the consequent of premise V1) from the hypothesis (i.e., the antecedent of premise V1), one 
would have to assume that successful theories that are considered false by current lights are 
indeed strictly false (cf. Saatsi 2005, 1092). But this auxiliary assumption appears to be in 
tension with the pessimist’s claim that most successful theories are strictly false. For, in order to 
claim that successful theories are strictly false by current lights, one must assume that the current 
lights are (at least approximately) right. But the current lights, of course, are current theories (see 
Devitt 2011, 288 and Mizrahi 2013a, 3214-3215). So, at the very least, one would have to 
assume that abandonment of a scientific theory entails that it is strictly false. But this assumption 
is also problematic because there were successful theories that were abandoned for reasons other 
than being considered false (see my 2013a, 3213). 
Whatever one assumes as an auxiliary assumption in order to derive the consequent of 
premise V1 from the antecedent of premise 1, i.e., from DIR, even if we grant that premise V2 is 
true, all that can be validly inferred is a disjunction, i.e., either DIR is false or the auxiliary 
assumption is false, not a “refutation” of DIR (i.e., ‘DIR is false’). That is: 
V1*. If DIR and A (where A is an auxiliary assumption such that abandonment of a 
theory is a sure sign of strict falsity), then there would be no successful theories 
that are strictly false. 
V2.  There are successful theories that are strictly false (such as those on Vickers’ list). 
V3*. Therefore, either it is not the case that DIR or it is not the case that A. 
Accordingly, the negation of DIR cannot be validly inferred from premises V1* and V2. Indeed, 
we have good reasons to think that the auxiliary assumption is false (Mizrahi 2013a, 3213). For 
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these reasons, construed as a modus tollens argument from counterexamples against DIR, 
Vickers’ argument fails to “confront” or pose a challenge to DIR. 
 
3. The New Induction 
Stanford’s (2006, 19) New Induction is an “induction over the history of science” (emphasis in 
original). (For criticisms of Stanford’s problem of unconceived alternatives and the New 
Induction, see Magnus 2006 and 2010, Chakravartty 2008, Godfrey-Smith 2008, Devitt 2011, 
and Ruhmkorff 2011.) Unlike the Old Induction, however, Stanford’s New Induction is about us 
(more specifically, scientists), not about theories per se. That is, according to Stanford: 
we have repeatedly found ourselves encouraged or even forced under the impetus 
provided by recalcitrant phenomena, unexpected anomalies, and other theoretical 
pressures to discover new theories that had remained previously unconceived despite 
being well confirmed by the evidence available to us (Stanford 2006, 19; emphasis 
added). 
The historical episodes that support this claim, according to Stanford, are the following 
theoretical transitions: 
1. elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl’s phlogiston theory to Lavoisier’s 
oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary chemistry 
2. various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology 
3. the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories 
4. effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether 
and contemporary electromagnetism 
5. humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease 
6. eighteenth century corpuscular theories of light to nineteenth century wave theories to the 
contemporary quantum mechanical conception 
7. Darwin’s pangenesis theory of inheritance to Weismann’s germ-plasm theory to 
Mendelain and the contemporary molecular genetics 
8. Cuvier’s theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species and 
from Lamarck’s autogenesis to Darwin’s evolutionary theory (Stanford 2006, 19-20) 
Stanford (2006, 20) claims that “even this fairly short list suffices to illustrate that the pattern is 
characteristic of theoretical science across a wide variety of fields and historical circumstances.” 
But does Stanford’s list really provide sufficient evidence for this general claim? 
Since Stanford (2006, 19) himself says that his argument is a “new induction over the 
history of science” (emphasis in original), I think that the most charitable way to interpret 
Stanford’s New Induction against the epistemic thesis of scientific realism is as follows: 
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Stanford’s list is supposed to be a sample from which it can be inferred by inductive 
generalization that most scientific theories have unconceived alternatives. (On Stanford’s own 
response to the problem of unconceived alternatives, namely, “epistemic instrumentalism,” see 
Fine 2008.) More explicitly: 
100% of the successful theories on Stanford’s list had unconceived alternatives. 
Therefore, probably, 
Most successful theories have unconceived alternatives. 
According to Stanford (2006, 20), then, “the history of scientific inquiry itself offers a 
straightforward rationale for thinking that there typically are alternatives to our best theories 
equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the 
time” (emphasis added). If Stanford’s New Induction were cogent, then it would challenge the 
realist’s claim that approximate truth is the best explanation for novel predictive success, since if 
there are indeed several alternatives that are equally well-confirmed by the evidence, and not all 
of them can be approximately true, then we should not believe that our current successful 
theories are approximately true (cf. Magnus 2010, 807). 
As Stanford (2006, 20) himself admits, this sample is too small. Is it representative of 
scientific theories in general? I will argue that Stanford’s sample is not a representative sample 
for the following reasons. First, Stanford’s list of historical episodes is not a random sample. 
Second, the historical record on which Stanford’s New Induction is based does not uniquely 
support a pessimistic conclusion. I will now flesh out these criticisms of Stanford’s New 
Induction in more detail. 
3a. Stanford’s New Induction is fallacious 
In light of the aforementioned considerations concerning the Old Induction, it should now be 
clear why Stanford’s list does not support an inductive generalization from a sample. Like 
Laudan’s list and Vickers’ list, the historical episodes on Stanford’s list were not randomly 
selected, but rather were cherry-picked to make a case against scientific realism. As Godfrey-
Smith (2011, 40) points out, as far as inductive generalizations from samples are concerned, “the 
power of randomness is what gives us a ‘bridge’ from observed to unobserved.” Since Stanford’s 
list is not a random sample, there is no “bridge” between Stanford’s sample of successful 
theories with unconceived alternatives and the general conclusion that most successful theories 
are such that they have unconceived alternatives. 
 
Again, this is not to say that Stanford intentionally or deliberately selected historical 
episodes that he took to be positive evidence for his case against scientific realism. Rather, to say 
that a sample of data was cherry-picked is to say that the sample is biased, and thus fails to be 
representative of the general population. If the old pessimist claims statistical significance for 
successful but false theories without acknowledging the cases of successful but not false 
(because not rejected as such) theories, then she is picking “only the most ripe cherries from the 
tree” (Willink 2013, 184). Similarly, if the new pessimist claims statistical significance for 
successful theories that have unconceived alternatives without acknowledging the episodes of 
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successful theories that have no unconceived alternatives that are equally well-confirmed by the 
evidence, then she is picking “only the most ripe cherries from the tree” (Willink 2013, 184). 
This is a problem not only because biased samples do not license inductive generalizations but 
also because a “cherry-picking” effect significantly increases the chance of a Type I error (false 
positives). Without random sampling, we cannot tell if Stanford’s list is not simply a list of false 
positives (i.e., theories that are thought to have unconceived alternatives that are equally well-
confirmed by the evidence but in fact do not). I will discuss some reasons to think that some of 
the items on Stanford’s list are in fact false positives. 
 
Before I do so, however, I should point out that an unconceived alternative, according to 
Stanford, is a competing theory that is “well confirmed by the body of actual evidence we have 
in hand” (Stanford 2006, 18). That is, a mere logical possibility is not an unconceived alternative 
because it is not a competing theory that is “well confirmed by the body of actual evidence we 
have in hand.” For example, the hypothesis that the universe is accelerating because God is 
blowing wind on galaxies is not an unconceived alternative to the dark energy hypothesis 
because it is not confirmed (let alone well confirmed) by the body of actual evidence we have in 
hand. (Cf. Forber 2008, 137.) 
 
I should also point out that, in light of the aforementioned discussion of Vickers’ 
argument as a deductive argument from counterexamples, it should be clear why Stanford’s New 
Induction would not work as a deductive argument from counterexamples. That is, if Stanford’s 
New Induction is meant to be a deductive argument that runs as follows: 
 
S1. If novel predictive success is a reliable mark of approximate truth (SR), then there 
would be no successful theories that have unconceived alternatives. 
S2.  There are successful theories that have unconceived alternatives. 
S3.  Therefore, it is not the case that SR. 
 
Then, although this argument appears to have a valid form (i.e., modus tollens), it is fallacious 
for pretty much the same reasons that the construal of Vickers’ argument as a deductive 
argument from counterexamples is fallacious. First, to give statistical significance to a select few, 
albeit vivid, counterexamples (in this case, successful theories with unconceived alternatives) 
while ignoring statistical evidence to the contrary (i.e., successful theories without unconceived 
alternatives) is a mistake in reasoning known as “misleading vividness” (Salmon 2013, 151). 
Second, given confirmation holism, premise S1 would be strictly false, since to say that novel 
predictive success is a reliable mark of approximate truth is to allow for some outliers (i.e., 
successful theories that are not approximately true). Since the episodes on Stanford’s list were 
not randomly selected, they may simply be outliers. Third, to derive the prediction (i.e., the 
consequent of premise S1) from the hypothesis (i.e., the antecedent of premise S1), i.e., from SR, 
one would have to assume that unconceived alternatives cannot all be approximately true. That 
is, to undercut the supposed explanatory connection between novel predictive success and 
approximate truth, the new pessimist needs to show that some successful alternatives are strictly 
false. And so, if there are several successful alternatives, and not all of them can be 
approximately true, it follows that some successful alternatives must be false. If this is correct, 
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then Stanford’s argument, construed as a deductive argument from counterexamples, should run 
as follows: 
 
S1*. If SR and A (where A is an auxiliary assumption such that, of a set of successful 
alternatives, at least some must be false), then there would be no successful 
theories that have unconceived alternatives. 
S2.  There are successful theories that have unconceived alternatives. 
S3*.  Therefore, either it is not the case that SR or it is not the case that A. 
 
As in the case of the deductive construal of Vickers’ argument, the negation of SR cannot be 
validly inferred from premises S1* and S2. Instead, what follows deductively is a disjunction, 
i.e., ‘not-SR or not-A’, not a negation of SR. For these reasons, construed as a modus tollens 
argument from counterexamples against SR, Stanford’s argument fails to pose a challenge to SR. 
In fact, there is a good reason to reject the auxiliary assumption. Recall that an unconceived 
alternative must be a competing theory (Stanford 2006, 18). But two theories may be competing 
theories and still be compatible in the sense that both could be true. For example, suppose that 
my car does no start. There are at least two potential explanations for this: (a) the car does not 
start because the battery is dead; (b) the car does not start because it is out of gas. These two 
explanations are competing hypotheses for the same fact, namely, that my car does not start, 
insofar as each, if true, would explain why the car does not start. But (a) and (b) are not 
incompatible, since both (a) and (b) could be true. If this is correct, then insofar as (a) and (b) are 
competing theories, it is not the case that at least one of them must be false. Even if we suppose 
for the sake of argument that (b) is an unconceived alternative to (a) that is equally well-
confirmed by the available evidence, it is still the case that both could be true. If this is correct, 
then the auxiliary assumption A in S1* is false. 
 
3b. Stanford’s historical evidence is indeterminate 
There are good reasons to think that Stanford’s list is a list of false positives, i.e., theories that are 
thought to have unconceived alternatives that are equally well-confirmed by the available 
evidence but in fact do not. In other words, the historical record on which Stanford’s New 
Induction is based does not uniquely support a pessimistic conclusion. Instead, Stanford’s 
historical evidence is indeterminate between a pessimistic interpretation and an optimistic 
interpretation. To see why, take, for example, (7) on Stanford’s list, which is the one that 
Stanford discusses at great length in his (2006). Now, consider the following historical facts 
about the development of theories of inheritance (Tobias et al 2011, 1): 
1859 Charles Darwin publishes On the Origin of Species 
1865 Gregor Mendel’s experiments on plant hybridization presented to Brunn Natural 
History Society 
1866 Mendel’s report formally published 
1868 Charles Darwin’s “provisional hypothesis of pangenesis” 
1885 “Continuity of the germ plasm” (August Weismann) 
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1889 Francis Galton’s Law of Ancestral Inheritance 
1900 Mendel’s work rediscovered (de Vries, Correns, and Tschermak) (See also Harper 
(2008, Appendix II.) 
Two patterns emerge from this timeline that are of particular interest for present purposes. First, 
Darwin’s hypothesis of pangenesis, Galton’s “stirp” theory of inheritance, and Weismann’s 
germ-plasm theory were near contemporaries, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. A timeline of theories of inheritance 
 
Second, far from being an unconceived alternative to Darwin’s hypothesis of pangenesis, 
Galton’s “stirp” theory of inheritance, or Weismann’s germ-plasm theory, the basic principles of 
genetics (albeit in rudimentary form) were conceived by Mendel in 1865, roughly around the 
same time (1869-1871) that Galton was experimentally testing Darwin’s hypothesis of 
pangenesis (Bulmer 2003, 116-118). In fact, of these theories of inheritance, it looks like 
genetics has been around the longest, if we count from “the moment of conception,” i.e., from 
Mendel’s work. 
Some might object to that by insisting that Mendel’s work remained unknown until 1900 
when it was rediscovered. But this objection will not do for the following reasons. First, even if 
Mendel’s work remained unknown until 1900, Stanford’s New Induction says that there are 
unconceived alternatives. In this case, however, Mendel did conceive of an alternative—even if 
he did not realize that—to contemporary hypotheses about inheritance. Second, Mendel’s work 
was rediscovered in 1900. From then on, alternative hypotheses about inheritance were left 
behind and genetics became the dominant theoretical approach to inheritance. This is why each 
line corresponding to a theory of inheritance (except Darwin’s hypothesis of pangenesis) in 
Figure 1 ends in 1900. 
It might seem as if Stanford has a reply to this line of criticism (see also Forber 2008, 
139). As Stanford writes: 
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what ultimately matters of course is not whether individual scientists are able to 
exhaustively consider the space of well-confirmed alternative theoretical possibilities, but 
whether scientific communities are able to do so. As a general matter, the failure of a 
given individual scientist to conceive of or consider particular theoretical alternatives 
serves us simply as evidence that the relevant alternatives were not conceived of or 
widely considered in the community at large (Stanford 2006, 129; emphasis in original). 
Note that this is another inductive argument. That is, from the fact that an individual scientist has 
failed to conceive of a theoretical alternative it doesn’t necessarily follow that the scientific 
community has failed to do so. In other words, the failure of one scientist is not conclusive 
evidence that the scientific community has failed to conceive of alternatives, for there may be 
other scientists who have conceived of alternatives, even if one scientist has failed to do so. 
Hence, the fact that an individual scientist has failed to conceive of a theoretical alternative is 
supposed to be statistical evidence that the scientific community has failed to do so. In other 
words, the inference is supposed to run like this: 
(i) Individual I is a member of community C who has failed to do X. 
Therefore, probably, 
(ii) All members of C have failed to do X. 
It should be clear that (i) does not make (ii) significantly more likely to be true, unless 
community C consists of only one or two members. Scientific communities, however, are usually 
larger than one or two members. As far as the inheritance episode is concerned, for instance, 
some key members of the scientific community, in addition to Darwin and Galton, include 
George Romanes (1848-1894), Hugo de Vries (1848-1935), Wilhelm Johannsen (1857-1927), 
William Bateson (1861-1926), and Thomas H. Morgan (1866-1945). (See Bowler 1989, 46-64.) 
For another example of the same patterns as those gleaned from the inheritance case, take 
(3) on Stanford’s list. Now, consider the following historical facts about the development of 
theories of electricity and magnetism (adapted from Baigrie 2007, 137-143): 
1600 William Gilbert’s De Magnete, Magneticisique Corporibus, et de Magno 
Magnete Tellure: the term ‘electric’ coined by Gilbert, classification of electric 
and non-electric substances, and description of the Earth as a magnetic entity 
1644 René Descartes’ mechanical explanation of magnetism involves an interaction 
between effluvia, threads and ducts 
1646 Sir Thomas Browne’s Pseudodoxia Epidemica, or, Enquiries into Very many 
received Tenets, and commonly presumed truths: definition of electricity as “a 
power to attract strawes or light bodies, and convert the needle freely placed” 
1745 Jean-Antoine Nollet proposes that electrical matter continuously flows between 
two charged objects 
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1751 Benjamin Franklin’s letters to a colleague are published as Experiments and 
Observations on Electricity: work on positive and negative charges, the use of 
pointed conductors, improvements to the Leyden jar, and a plan for his kite 
experiment 
1759 Franz Aepinus’ Tentamen Theoriae Electricitatis et Magnetismi: treatment of 
electricity and magnetism in terms of mathematics 
1802 Gian Domenico Romagnosi discovers a link between electricity and magnetism 
when he observes that a voltaic pile deflects a magnetic needle 
1820 Hans Christian Ørsted notices that the magnetic needle of a compass aligns itself 
perpendicularly to a current-carrying wire 
1846 Michael Faraday suggests that light could be an electromagnetic phenomenon 
1847 Hermann von Helmholtz reads his paper On the Conservation of Force to the 
Physical Society of Berlin, providing an account of the principle of the 
conservation of energy that governs electrostatic, magnetic, chemical, and other 
forms of energy 
1855 James Clerk Maxwell’s On Faraday’s Lines of Force: relating Faraday’s 
conception of lines of force to the flow of a liquid and using analytical 
mathematics to derive equations for electric and magnetic phenomena 
1864 James Clerk Maxwell’s electromagnetism equations appear in On a Dynamical 
Theory of the Electromagnetic Field 
1867 Ludwig Lorenz shows that Maxwell’s equations can be derived from his scalar 
and vector potentials 
1873 James Clerk Maxwell’s Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism 
1881 Hermann von Helmholtz argues that electricity is divided into elementary 
particles similar to atoms 
1887 Heinrich Hertz builds an apparatus for generating and detecting the 
electromagnetic waves predicted by the work of James Clerk Maxwell and 
discovers the photoelectric effect 
1892 Hendrik Lorentz expands and modifies James Clerk Maxwell’s theory of 
electromagnetism to develop his own electron theory 
1897 J.J. Thomson proposes that cathode rays consist of a stream of negatively charged 
particles much smaller than an atom 
1900 Max Planck introduces his radiation law, the fundamental physical constant that 
bears his name, and his concept of energy quanta 
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1904 Hendrik Lorentz develops a set of equations known as the Lorentz 
transformations in his attempt to explain the results of the Michelson-Morley 
experiment 
1905 Albert Einstein formulates his special theory of relativity, suggesting that 
electricity and magnetism are two aspects of a single phenomenon 
As in the case of theories of inheritance, two patterns emerge from this timeline that are of 
particular interest for present purposes. First, the various conceptions of electricity as effluvia, 
single fluid, force, particles, and waves were near contemporaries, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. A timeline of theories of electricity and magnetism 
 
Second, far from being an unconceived alternative to these early conceptions of electricity, 
conceptions of electricity as a power or force go back as early as 1646, and early attempts to treat 
both electricity and magnetism mathematically go back to 1759. In fact, of all these conceptions 
of electricity and magnetism, it looks like conceptions of electricity and magnetism as powers or 
forces have been around the longest, if we count from “the moment of conception,” i.e., from Sir 
Thomas Browne’s work. (On “physical lines of force,” “magnetic force,” and “fields of force” in 
Faraday, Maxwell, and Hertz, see Cohen 2001, 301-312.) 
To this some might object by claiming that the various theoretical conceptions of 
electricity enjoyed non-overlapping periods of popularity. That may be true but the historical 
episodes presented by Stanford do not support this claim. As we have seen, the fact that one or 
two scientists failed to conceive of an alternative does not make it significantly more likely that 
the scientific community as a whole failed to conceive of an alternative. Likewise, the fact that 
an alternative was neglected by a few does not make it significantly more likely that it was 
neglected by the scientific community as a whole. As Figure 2 shows, at any point in time there 
were at least two theoretical conceptions of electricity and magnetism available. To tell which 
theoretical conception was the popular one, we need more than one or two data points. For 
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present purposes, however, there is no need to settle this in order to evaluate Stanford’s 
argument. For, according to Stanford, to count as a conceived alternative, a theory need not be 
popular. It only needs to be a competing theory that is “well confirmed by the body of actual 
evidence we have in hand” (Stanford 2006, 18). 
Similar patterns, I submit, can be gleaned from the other historical episodes on Stanford’s 
list. For instance, concerning theories of organic species—(8) on Stanford’s list—the “general 
idea of the possibility of species change is an old concept” (Sloan 2014). It can be traced as far 
back as Empedocles (ca. 495-435 BCE). In On Nature, Empedocles offers a theory of the 
generation of organisms, according to which they come into being by processes of separation and 
coalescence that are influenced by Strife and Love. And in Book Five of On the Nature of Things 
(De rerum natura), “Lucretius sets out a speculative account of the gradual origin of living 
beings from an initial atomic chaos through an undirected process that sorts out the best adapted 
forms and eliminates those not suited to their conditions” (Sloan 2014). (See also Johnson and 
Wilson 2007.) So, far from being an unconceived alternative to Cuvier’s hypothesis that 
“animals were formed on a series of four distinct and autonomous body plans (embranchements) 
that may display some unity of type within the embranchements” (Sloan 2014) and Lamarck’s 
theory of species transformism, the concept of evolution can be traced back to the Greek 
Atomists. In fact, if we count from “the moment of conception,” then of all these zoogonies, it 
looks like the concept of evolution has been around the longest. Moreover, as in the cases of 
theories of inheritance and electricity, only one theory has survived as the dominant theory. 
It might seem as if earlier zoogonies share some broad or general features with later ones 
but they are profoundly dissimilar in details. And so, if T1 and T2 are theories that are profoundly 
dissimilar in details, then T1 and T2 cannot be competing theories. If T1 and T2 are not competing 
theories, they cannot be alternatives. For, according to Stanford, an alternative is a competing 
theory that is “well confirmed by the body of actual evidence we have in hand” (Stanford 2006, 
18). Consequently, the Greek Atomists’ conception of evolution does not count as an alternative 
to other zoogonies, for it was profoundly different in details from these other theories. As 
Stanford (2006, 53) writes, “it will not be enough to undermine the new induction that earlier 
theorists managed to conceive of later alternatives in this abstract and general way.” 
For this defense of Stanford’s argument to succeed, however, the new pessimist would 
have to specify criteria of similarities and dissimilarities between theories. After all, ‘abstract and 
general way’ is a vague expression. What are the concrete and specific ways in which later 
alternatives must be conceived of by earlier theorists? Of course, earlier theorists should not be 
able to conceive of later alternatives in precise and exact ways; otherwise, earlier theorists would 
be conceiving of precisely those later alternatives. Specifying the concrete and specific ways in 
which later alternatives must be conceived of by earlier theorists is no easy task, since the 
similarities and dissimilarities have to be relevant to whether the theories should properly count 
as competing or alternative theories. For example, here is a similarity between the General 
Theory of Relativity and the Special Theory of Relativity: both were proposed by Albert 
Einstein. But this similarity does not make them competing theories. Likewise, here is a 
dissimilarity between the “stirp” theory of inheritance and the germ plasm theory: the former was 
proposed by a knight, whereas the latter was proposed by a German biologist. But this 
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dissimilarity does not mean that they are not competing theories or genuine alternatives. 
(Stanford regards them as such.) 
Now, scientific realists will probably look at the aforementioned patterns and draw a 
realist conclusion to the effect that the best theory has prevailed. That is, the alternative theories 
were not as explanatorily and predictively successful as the prevailing theory, and thus they were 
abandoned. For realists, this is a reason for optimism. Antirealists, on the other hand, will 
probably look at these patterns and draw a pessimistic conclusion to the effect that scientists are 
not getting better at theory choice. For antirealists, the fact that alternative theories were 
abandoned in favor of one dominant theory is not a reason for optimism. After all, there could be 
as of yet unconceived alternatives even to the dominant theory. A feature of the scientific realism 
debate has been that “Pessimists look at the historical record of science and see failure, whereas 
realists look at the same historical record and see success” (Mizrahi 2013a, 3214). 
The problem with this antirealist response to the aforementioned patterns is that it turns 
the problem of unconceived alternatives from a probability claim, which is supposed to be 
backed up by the historical record, to a mere possibility claim, and thus the New Induction 
becomes a conceivability argument about what is merely possible rather than an inductive 
argument about what is probable. However, the problem of unconceived alternatives is not 
supposed to be a logical problem of failing to conceive of logically possible alternatives to then-
well-confirmed theories. Rather, it is supposed to be a real problem of failing to conceive of 
empirically viable alternatives to well-confirmed theories, which turned out to be equally 
confirmed by the evidence (cf. Votsis 2007). And the New Induction is supposed to show that 
this pattern will probably continue, i.e., that current scientists fail to conceive of alternatives to 
their current well-confirmed theories. As we have seen, however, in the case of theories of 
inheritance, electricity, and species origins, alternatives were very much conceived of around the 
same time, and all were abandoned except for the one that emerged as the dominant theory. If 
antirealists were to insist in response that there could be unconceived alternatives even to the 
dominant theory, then they would be making a mere possibility claim, not a probability claim 
that is supposed to be supported by the historical record. 
For present purposes, however, there is no need to settle the question about which 
conclusion should be drawn from the aforementioned patterns (i.e., that several alternative 
theories were available around the same time until one prevailed as the dominant theory): an 
optimistic one or a pessimistic one. For the mere fact that one can draw both pessimistic and 
optimistic conclusions from the historical record shows that Stanford’s historical evidence is 
indeterminate between a pessimistic interpretation and an optimistic interpretation, and thus that 
the New Induction is a fallacious argument against scientific realism. More explicitly, it shows 
that, contrary to what Stanford (2006, 47) claims, “this single series of historical episodes may 
[not] go a considerable distance toward showing that we are in possession of a quite general 
challenge to scientific realism,” since the same series of historical episodes can be interpreted as 
supporting, rather than challenging, scientific realism. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that we should draw a realist or optimistic conclusion 
from Stanford’s historical episodes. I am also not suggesting that there are no serious problems 
with the NMA. (See, e.g., Frost-Arnold 2010, Newman 2010, and Dicken 2013.) Nor do I have 
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any interest in defending the NMA. In fact, I think that scientific realism cannot be defended on 
abductive grounds (see my 2012 and my 2013b, where I defend a realist position that does not 
rely on the NMA or IBE). Even if an argument (like the NMA) is bad, however, there are good 
and bad ways to object to it. Since scientific realism is supposed to be a scientific explanation 
that is based on a defeasible inference to the best explanation, trying to undermine such an 
argument by cherry-picking a few cases from the history of science is ineffective unless we have 
reasons to believe that the cherry-picked cases are representative (cf. Mizrahi 2013a, 3224). As 
far as Stanford’s list is concerned, however, we have no reasons to think that it is representative 
of the general population (of scientific theories). Since Stanford’s list is a small and biased 
sample, we have no reason to think that it is a representative sample. Since we have no reason to 
think that Stanford’s list is a representative sample, for all we know, it may consist entirely of 
outliers. Again, a claim of the form ‘Fness is a reliable predictor of Gness’ (e.g., smoking 
increases one’s chances of getting sick with lung cancer) cannot be “confronted” or challenged 
by pointing to a few outliers (e.g., a few people who smoke but do not get sick with lung cancer), 
the scientific realist’s claim that approximate truth is the best explanation for novel predictive 
success cannot be “confronted” or challenged by pointing to a few outliers (i.e., successful but 
false theories). Indeed, as we have seen, the very historical record to which Stanford appeals in 
his New Induction can be seen as supporting, not challenging, scientific realism. 
Finally, some may complain that to ask pessimists to meet the standard of random 
sampling is to ask too much because they cannot meet this standard. In reply, I would like to 
make the following points. Random sampling is generally accepted as a standard of good 
inductive argumentation. As Govier (2013, 259) puts it, “the clue to reliable inductive 
generalizations is finding a sample that is representative of the population.” So, if it is indeed the 
case that pessimists cannot meet this standard of reliable inductive argumentation, then they 
should not argue by induction. If the only arguments one can make are bad ones, then one should 
not make any arguments at all. Fortunately for pessimists, I think that this standard of good 
inductive argumentation can actually be met. Discussing the methodology in detail is beyond the 
scope of this paper, which is already quite long, so I will simply refer the reader to the work of 
authors who have followed a much more rigorous methodology of inductive argumentation than 
cherry-picking. The first example is the work of Fahrbach (2011 and forthcoming) where 
statistical evidence is presented for what Fahrbach calls “the exponential growth of science” (cf. 
Wray 2013). The second example is my own work (2013a) in which I present random samples of 
scientific theories and laws that were not abandoned and are not considered strictly false by 
current practitioners in the relevant fields. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that Old Inductions over the history of science, like the one recently 
advanced by Vickers (2013), and New Inductions over the history of science, like the one 
advanced by Stanford (2006), are fallacious arguments. Such arguments from the history of 
science fail to pose a serious challenge to scientific realism (particularly the epistemic thesis of 
scientific realism or the divide et impera strategy) because they are based on unrepresentative 
(i.e., small and biased) samples. In addition, I have shown that the historical episodes Stanford 
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cites in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between a pessimistic interpretation and 
an optimistic interpretation. The general lesson, I submit, is that more systematic studies of the 
history of science—as opposed to cherry-picking case histories—are needed in order to 
determine whether or not the historical record warrants a realist stance. 
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